Recalling experiences of scarcity reduces children's generosity relative to recalling abundance.

Does a sense of having less or more than what one needs affect one's generosity? The question of how resource access influences prosocial behavior has received much attention in studies with adults but has produced conflicting findings. To better understand this relationship, we tested whether resource access affects generosity in the developing mind. In our preregistered investigation, we used a narrative recall method to explore how temporary, experimentally evoked states of resource abundance or scarcity affect children's sharing. In this study, 6- to 8-year-old American children (N = 148) recalled an experience of scarcity or abundance and then chose how many prizes to share with another child. We found that children in the scarce condition rated themselves as sadder, viewed their resource access as more limited, and shared fewer tokens than children in the abundant condition. Our results indicate that recalling past experiences of resource access creates distinct behavioral consequences for children and suggest that a sense of "having less" may encourage a strategy of resource conservation relative to a sense of "having more," even at a young age.

How retributive motives shape the emergence of third-party punishment across intergroup contexts.

This study examines how retributive motives-the desire to punish for the purpose of inflicting harm in the absence of future benefits-shape third-party punishment behavior across intergroup contexts. Six- to nine-year-olds (N = 151, Mage = 8.00, SDage = 1.15; 54% White, 18% mixed ethnicities, 17% Asian American; 46% female; from the USA) could punish ingroup, outgroup, or non-group transgressors by removing positive resources and allocating negative ones. Both punishments were described as retributive, yet allocating negative resources was perceived as more retributive than removing positive ones. We predicted that children would punish outgroups more so than ingroups and that this effect would be especially pronounced when punishment is perceived as particularly retributive. The results did not align with this prediction; instead, children similarly punished all agents.

The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network.

The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.

Children cooperate more with in-group members than with out-group members in an iterated face-to-face Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

Adults are more likely to cooperate with in-group members than with out-group members in the context of social dilemmas, situations in which self-interest is in conflict with collective interest. This bias has the potential to profoundly shape human cooperation, and therefore it is important to understand when it emerges in development. Here we asked whether 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 146) preferentially cooperate with in-group members in the context of a well-studied social dilemma, the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. We assigned children to minimal groups and paired them with unfamiliar same-age and same-gender peers. Consistent with our predictions, children were more likely to cooperate with in-group members than with out-group members in this minimal group context. This finding adds to the current literature on group bias in children's prosocial behavior by showing that it affects decision making in a context that calls on strategic cooperation. In addition, our analyses revealed an effect of gender, with girls more likely to cooperate than boys regardless of the group membership of their partner. Exploring this gender effect further, we found an interaction between gender and age across condition, with older girls showing less sensitivity to the group membership of their partner than younger girls and with older boys showing more sensitivity to the group membership of the partner than younger boys. Our findings suggest that risky cooperation in the face of social dilemmas is shaped by group bias during childhood, highlighting the potentially deeply rooted ties between cooperation and parochialism in humans.

Why imagining what could have happened matters for children's social cognition.

Counterfactual thinking is a relatively late emerging ability in childhood with key implications for emerging social cognition and behavior.

Computational signatures of inequity aversion in children across seven societies.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General on Aug 10 2023 (see record 2023-96713-001). In the original article, there were affiliation errors for the first and 14th authors. The affiliations for Dorsa Amir are Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley; and Department of Psychology, Boston College. The affiliation for Katherine McAuliffe is Department of Psychology, Boston College. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Inequity aversion is an important factor in fairness behavior. Previous work suggests that children show more cross-cultural variation in their willingness to reject allocations that would give them more rewards than their partner-advantageous inequity-as opposed to allocations that would give them less than their partner-disadvantageous inequity. However, as past work has relied solely on children's decisions to accept or reject these offers, the algorithms underlying this pattern of variation remain unclear. Here, we explore the computational signatures of inequity aversion by applying a computational model of decision-making to data from children (N = 807) who played the Inequity Game across seven societies. Specifically, we used drift-diffusion models to formally distinguish evaluative processing (i.e., the computation of the subjective value of accepting or rejecting inequity) from alternative factors such as decision speed and response strategies. Our results suggest that variation in the development of inequity aversion across societies is best accounted for by variation in the drift rate-the direction and strength of the evaluative preference. Our findings underscore the utility of looking beyond decision data to better understand behavioral diversity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

When not helping is nice: Children's changing evaluations of helping during COVID-19.

A key aspect of children's moral and social understanding involves recognizing the value of helpful behaviors. COVID-19 has complicated this process; behaviors generally considered praiseworthy were considered problematic during the COVID-19 pandemic. The present study examined whether 6- to 12-year-olds (N = 228; residing in the United States) adapt their evaluations of helpful behavior in response to shifting norms. Specifically, we presented children with scenarios featuring helpful and unhelpful actions that involved physical interaction (e.g., hugging) or nonphysical interaction (e.g., recruiting a teacher); although all children were tested during the COVID-19 pandemic, stories portrayed individuals either before or during COVID-19. While children generally judged helpfulness positively and unhelpfulness negatively, children exhibited a selective shift in their judgments for COVID-19 scenarios: children considered helpfulness negatively and unhelpfulness positively if helping required physical interaction. These findings demonstrate that children flexibly tune their social evaluations of helping to align with evolving norms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Having less means wanting more: Children hold an intuitive economic theory of diminishing marginal utility.

Judgments surrounding resource acquisition and valuation are ubiquitous in daily life. How do humans decide what something is worth to themselves or someone else? One important cue to value is that of resource quantity. As described by economists, the principle of diminishing marginal utility (DMU) holds that as resource abundance increases, the value placed on each unit decreases; likewise, when resources become more scarce, the value placed on each unit rises. While prior research suggests that adults make judgments that align with this concept, it is unclear whether children do so. In Study 1 (n = 104), children (ages 5 through 8) were presented with scenarios involving losses or gains to others' resources and predicted the actions and emotions of the individuals involved. Participants made decisions that aligned with DMU, e.g., expecting individuals with fewer resources to expend more effort for an additional resource than individuals with greater resources. In Study 2 (n = 104), children incorporated information about preferences when inferring others' resource valuations, showing how quantity and preference are both included in children's inferences about others' utility. Our results indicate the early emergence of an intuitive economic theory that aligns with an important economic principle. Long before formal learning on this topic, children integrate quantity and preference information to sensibly predict others' resource valuations, with implications for economic decision-making, social preferences, and judgments of partner quality across the lifespan.

No strong evidence for universal gender differences in the development of cooperative behaviour across societies.

Human cooperation varies both across and within societies, and developmental studies can inform our understanding of the sources of both kinds of variation. One key candidate for explaining within-society variation in cooperative behaviour is gender, but we know little about whether gender differences in cooperation take root early in ontogeny or emerge similarly across diverse societies. Here, we explore two existing cross-cultural datasets of 4- to 15-year-old children's preferences for equality in experimental tasks measuring prosociality (14 societies) and fairness (seven societies), and we look for evidence of (i) widespread gender differences in the development of cooperation, and (ii) substantial societal variation in gender differences. This cross-cultural approach is crucial for revealing universal human gender differences in the development of cooperation, and it helps answer recent calls for greater cultural diversity in the study of human development. We find that gender has little impact on the development of prosociality and fairness within these datasets, and we do not find much evidence for substantial societal variation in gender differences. We discuss the implications of these findings for our knowledge about the nature and origin of gender differences in cooperation, and for future research attempting to study human development using diverse cultural samples. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cooperation among women: evolutionary and cross-cultural perspectives'.

Children use common knowledge to solve coordination problems.

Recent work suggests that common knowledge is an important cognitive mechanism for coordinating prosocial behavior, in part because it reduces uncertainty about others' cooperative behavior. However, it remains unclear whether children also rely on common knowledge to solve coordination problems. Here we examined whether 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 133) from the United States were more likely to attempt to coordinate when they had common knowledge about a joint payoff. Participants saw 3 vignettes that modeled the structure of a 2-player coordination problem and were provided with common knowledge, secondary knowledge, or private knowledge about the mutually beneficial, but risky, joint payoff. By 6 years of age, participants were more likely to attempt to coordinate when they had common knowledge than secondary knowledge, and secondary knowledge than private knowledge. Participants were also most likely to expect the other player to coordinate, and were most certain in their predictions, when there was common knowledge. Results indicate that, by middle childhood, children are able to solve coordination problems by relying on common knowledge, in part because it likely increases their certainty in others' cooperative behavior. Overall, findings suggest that common knowledge is an important cognitive mechanism for coordinating behavior and that it does so by reducing uncertainty about others' cooperative behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The ontogeny of children's social emotions in response to (un)fairness.

Humans have a deeply rooted sense of fairness, but its emotional foundation in early ontogeny remains poorly understood. Here, we asked if and when 4- to 10-year-old children show negative social emotions, such as shame or guilt, in response to advantageous unfairness expressed through a lowered body posture (measured using a Kinect depth sensor imaging camera). We found that older, but not younger children, showed more negative emotions, i.e. a reduced upper body posture, after unintentionally disadvantaging a peer on (4,1) trials than in response to fair (1,1) outcomes between themselves and others. Younger children, in contrast, expressed more negative emotions in response to the fair (1,1) split than in response to advantageous inequity. No systematic pattern of children's emotional responses was found in a non-social context, in which children divided resources between themselves and a non-social container. Supporting individual difference analyses showed that older children in the social context expressed negative emotions in response to advantageous inequity without directly acting on this negative emotional response by rejecting an advantageously unfair offer proposed by an experimenter at the end of the study. These findings shed new light on the emotional foundation of the human sense of fairness and suggest that children's negative emotional response to advantageous unfairness developmentally precedes their rejection of advantageously unfair resource distributions.

Reward type influences adults' rejections of inequality in a task designed for children.

In the context of economic games, adults sacrifice money to avoid unequal outcomes, showing so-called inequity aversion. Child-friendly adaptations of these games have shown that children, too, show inequity aversion. Moreover, inequity aversion shows a clear developmental trajectory, with young children rejecting only disadvantageously unequal distributions and older children rejecting both disadvantageously and advantageously unequal distributions. However, based on existing work, it is difficult to compare adult and child responses to inequity because (1) adapting economic games to make them child-friendly may importantly alter the dynamics of the fairness interaction and (2) adult work typically uses abstract rewards such as money while work with children typically uses more concrete rewards like candy, stickers or toys. Here we adapted the Inequity Game-a paradigm designed to study children's responses to inequality in isolation from other concerns-to test inequity aversion in adults (N = 104 pairs). We manipulated whether participants made decisions about concrete rewards (candy) or abstract rewards (tokens that could be traded in for money). We found that, like children, adults rejected unequal payoffs in this task. Additionally, we found that reward type mattered: adults rejected disadvantageous-but not advantageous-monetary distributions, yet rejected both disadvantageous and advantageous candy distributions. These findings allow us to draw clearer comparisons across child and adult responses to unfairness and help paint a fuller picture of inequity aversion in humans.

Children's judgments of interventions against norm violations: COVID-19 as a naturalistic case study.

The coronavirus pandemic has had a significant influence on social interactions, introducing novel social norms such as mask-wearing and social distancing to protect people's health. Because these norms and associated practices are completely novel, it is unknown how children assess what kinds of interventions are appropriate under what circumstances and what principles they draw on in their decisions. We investigated children's reasoning about interventions against individuals who failed to adhere to COVID-19 norms. In this pre-registered study (N = 128), 4- to 7-year-olds heard stories about a norm violator, that is, a person who refuses to wear a mask in class (COVID condition) or wear indoor shoes in class when his or her shoes are muddy (Muddy Shoes condition). Children evaluated four different interventions-giving a mask/indoor shoes (Giving), preventing the person from entering (Exclusion), throwing a paper ball at the person (Throwing), and not intervening (Doing Nothing)-in terms of their rightness, niceness, and effectiveness. We found that across measures children evaluated Giving most positively, whereas they viewed Throwing most negatively. Doing Nothing and Exclusion received mixed evaluations across measures, revealing nuanced judgments of these interventions in children. In most measures, there was no difference between the COVID and Muddy Shoes conditions, suggesting that children's evaluations are not specific to the novel COVID-19 context. Together, our results show that children dynamically evaluate each intervention, taking multiple factors into account. The current study has implications for the development of interventions against norm violations.

Children strategically conceal selfishness.

Can children exploit knowledge asymmetries to get away with selfishness? This question was addressed by testing 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 164; 81 girls) from the Northeastern United States in a modified Ultimatum Game. Children were assigned to the roles of proposers (who offered some proportion of an endowment) and responders (who could accept or reject offers). Both players in the Informed condition knew the endowment quantity in each trial. However, in the Uninformed condition, only proposers knew this information. In this condition, many proposers made "strategically selfish" offers that seemed fair based on the responders' incomplete knowledge but were actually highly selfish. These results indicate that even young children possess the ability to deceive others about their selfishness.

An earlier role for intent in children's partner choice versus punishment.

Among the many factors that influence our moral judgments, two are especially important: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions-from both theoretical and empirical perspectives-we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others' intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: Young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier partner choice in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Cleaner fish are sensitive to what their partners can and cannot see.

Much of human experience is informed by our ability to attribute mental states to others, a capacity known as theory of mind. While evidence for theory of mind in animals to date has largely been restricted to primates and other large-brained species, the use of ecologically-valid competitive contexts hints that ecological pressures for strategic deception may give rise to components of theory of mind abilities in distantly-related taxonomic groups. In line with this hypothesis, we show that cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) exhibit theory of mind capacities akin to those observed in primates in the context of their cooperative cleaning mutualism. These results suggest that ecological pressures for strategic deception can drive human-like cognitive abilities even in very distantly related species.

A comparative test of inequity aversion in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and dingoes (Canis dingo).

Despite much recent empirical work on inequity aversion in nonhuman species, many questions remain about its distribution across taxa and the factors that shape its evolution and expression. Past work suggests that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and wolves (Canis lupus) are averse to inequitable resource distributions in contexts that call upon some degree of training such as 'give paw' and 'buzzer press' tasks. However, it is unclear whether inequity aversion appears in other canid species and in other experimental contexts. Using a novel inequity aversion task that does not require specific training, this study helps address these gaps by investigating inequity aversion in domestic dogs and a closely related but non-domesticated canid, the dingo (Canis dingo). Subjects were presented with equal and unequal reward distributions and given the opportunity to approach or refuse to approach allocations. Measures of interest were (1) subjects' refusal to approach when getting no food; (2) approach latency; and (3) social referencing. None of these measures differed systematically across the inequity condition and control conditions in either dogs or dingoes. These findings add to the growing literature on inequity aversion in canids, providing data from a new species and a new experimental context. Additionally, they raise questions about the experimental features that must be in place for inequity aversion to appear in canids.

Trustworthiness is distinct from generosity in children.

Interpersonal trust is a key component of cooperation, helping support the complex social networks found across societies. Trust typically involves two parties, one who trusts by taking on risk through investment in a second party, who can be trustworthy and produce mutual benefits. To date, the developmental literature has focused primarily on the trustor, meaning we know little about the ontogeny of trustworthiness. Whereas trusting can be motivated by self-interest, one-shot trustworthiness is more squarely situated in the prosocial domain, involving a direct tradeoff between self-interest and others' interests. However, this raises the question of whether trustworthiness is distinct from generosity. In this preregistered study, we examine the origins of trustworthiness using an intuitive version of the Trust Game, in which a first party invests resources in a second party who can split the gains. We recruited N = 118 5-to-8 year-old American children (Mage = 6.94, n = 59 girls, 57% White, 88% of parents with bachelor's degree or higher), split between the Trustworthiness condition, where another party's investment is instrumental for obtaining greater resources, and the Generosity condition, where the other party is a passive recipient. We found that children in the Trustworthiness condition shared significantly more resources than those in the Generosity condition. Further, children in the Trustworthiness condition predicted that the first party expected them to share a greater number of resources. Overall, these results demonstrate that trustworthiness is distinct from generosity in childhood and suggest that children spontaneously grasp and engage in a key aspect of cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Third-party punishment promotes fairness in children.

Third-party punishment can promote fair behavior. However, the mechanisms by which this happens are unclear. Third-party punishment may increase fair behavior by providing direct feedback, helping shape the behavior of those punished, or through an influence on reputation, by encouraging the transgressor to behave appropriately before a third-party audience. Investigating whether and how third-party punishment leads to fairness in children during middle childhood-a key developmental period in the emergence of fairness-presents an ideal context in which to explore these 2 mechanisms. Six to nine-year-old children (N = 121) allocated resources between themselves and a partner in a forced-choice dictator game. In the Direct Feedback condition, a third party punished if the child chose the less fair option. In the Reputation condition, a third party merely observed the child. In the Baseline condition, no third party was present. We find that the Direct Feedback condition increased fairness relative to the other conditions, especially among younger children. These results highlight an important link between third-party punishment and fairness in children and, more broadly, help clarify the mechanisms through which third-party punishment can influence fair behavior and thereby human cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Children favor punishment over restoration.

Why do people punish selfish behavior? Are they motivated to punish perpetrators of selfishness (retribution) or to compensate the victims of selfishness (restoration)? Developmental data can provide important insight into these questions by revealing whether punishment of selfishness is more retributive or restorative when it first emerges. Across two studies, we examined costly third-party intervention in 6- to 9-year-olds. In Study 1, children learned about a selfish actor who refused to share with a recipient. Children then chose to (1) punish the selfish actor by rejecting their payoff (retribution); (2) compensate the victim of selfishness by equalizing payoffs between the perpetrator and victim (restoration); or (3) do nothing. We found that children were more likely to punish than compensate in response to selfishness, suggesting that intervention in this context is more retributive than restorative. In Study 2, we tested third-party intervention in the face of generosity which, like selfishness, can lead to unequal outcomes. As in Study 1, children in this context could reject unequal payoffs, thereby depriving the recipient of the advantageous payoff but having no effect on the actor. Children could also use compensation in this context, equalizing the payoffs between actor and recipient. We found that children did not punish inequality that stemmed from generosity, suggesting that the retributive punishment in Study 1 was specifically targeting selfishness rather than inequality more generally. These results contribute to the debate on the function of third-party punishment in humans, suggesting that retributive motives toward selfish transgressors are privileged during ontogeny.